The Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions?

The paradox of federalism is about whether self-rule accommodates or exacerbates ethnic divisions. A federal arrangement which formally recognizes ethno-linguistic diversity to help manage divisions can also pave the way for eventual disintegration. The case studies in this book cover a wide geographical basis (Canada, Scotland, Spain, Belgium, Bosnia, Kosovo, Russia, India, and Iraq) and seek to outline under what conditions federalism can deliver its promise of resolving ethnic conflict.

The book aims to bridge those who study federalism and decentralization in the developed world and those who study the politics of ethnic divisions in the developing world. We also wanted to bridge the scholarship from the two sides of the Atlantic, as well as the subfields of Comparative Politics, International Relations, and Constitutional Politics. Furthermore, the volume has a number of high-profile senior scholars with name recognition from both sides of the Atlantic.

The scope of the volume is wide – historically, methodologically, and geographically; and has relevance for the applied side as well as the theoretical literature. Consequently, we believe this is a timely collection on the high profile topic of Ethnic Conflict/Conflict Resolution.

This book was based on a special issue of  Regional and Federal Studies