Class IX Supply Operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Ss the U.S. Army 's Doctrine Adequate?
Book Details
Author(s)Ted R. Stuart
PublisherBiblioScholar
ISBN / ASIN1249911230
ISBN-139781249911234
AvailabilityUsually ships in 24 hours
MarketplaceUnited States 🇺🇸
Description
Despite the overall success of U.S. Army forces during the "major combat operations "" phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), there is a widely held perception that the logistics system was far less effective than it should have been during OIF. The Class IX (repair parts) supply system, in particular, seems to have been almost completely ineffective within the theater of operations. This paper examines whether the Army 's doctrine for Class IX supply operations needs to be revised in light of the Army 's OIF experience. It first examines the Army 's Class IX supply doctrine at the time of OIF, to include the changes implemented over the past decade due to the shift from a supply-based to a distribution-based logistics system. It then examines the OIF experience, and demonstrates that a late deployment of CSS units to the theater, a significant shortage of transportation and other CSS units, an inadequate tactical communications infrastructure, and insufficient Automated Identification Technology (AIT) and In-transit Visibility (ITV) systems all had major negative impacts on the Class IX supply system. It also examines OIF units 19 experiences, both positive and negative, with their Authorized Stockage List (ASL) and Prescribed Load List (PLL) repair parts stockpiles. Finally, this paper compares the OIF experience to doctrine, using as a framework the principles of distribution from Joint Publication 4-01.4, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution, and Field Manual 100-10-1, Theater Distribution. This comparison revealed that the failure of the Class IX supply system during Operation Iraqi Freedom did not result from flaws in the Army 's doctrine, and therefore, the doctrine itself does not need revision. Rather, the breakdown of the Class IX theater distribution system resulted from two main causes outside of doctrine. The first of these was the failure to deploy CSS forces early enough and in sufficient numbers to support an ope
