India's Security Environment: Towards The Year 2000

The end of the Cold War, marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union, transformed the global security environment. This sudden change generated a catharsis in India's security perspectives and policies. During much of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was a pivotal actor that influenced India's formulation and conduct of its security policies.1 India had established security and military ties with the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s following wars with China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965. The growing collaboration was highlighted in September 1971 by the Indo Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship which was signed at the height of the East Pakistan secessionist movement.2 With Sino American "rapprochement" also in progress at the same time, the treaty with the Soviet Union enabled India to resolve the "Bangladesh" issue by force in December 1971. India waged war with Pakistan without much fear of military intervention by Pakistan's then allies, China and the United States. However, even before 1991, India's security problems were not directly related to Cold War politics. The primary sources of Indian security fears were regional, not global, although these fears were compounded by great power intrusions into the region emanating from the politics of the Cold War. Rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, and China and the Soviet Union, enabled Pakistan to obtain American and Chinese military assistance to counter Indian military capabilities. Meanwhile, India had turned increasingly to the Soviet Union for weapons to counter or preempt Pakistani arms procurement. During this period there were constant pressures on the part of both India and Pakistan to become nuclear weapons states. Two underlying characteristics may be noted about the covert or latent nuclear arms race in South Asia, one perpetual and the other a relatively new situation. First, Pakistan's propulsion towards nuclear weapons arose mainly from strategic imperatives, namely, the threat from India. The nuclear energy rationalization put forward by Pakistan later was an afterthought. The Pakistani program may be viewed, therefore, as a "Security-to-Energy" driven phenomenon. India, on the other hand, perceived nuclear energy programs as critical for meeting anticipated shortfalls in the country's overall energy needs. Thereafter, various security rationalizations for nuclear weapons, such as the Chinese nuclear threat, tended to be spinoffs from the technological capability generated by the energy program. The Indian program, therefore, may be seen as an "Energy-to Security" driven phenomenon. This analytical distinction is important when attempting to prevent proliferation in South Asia. In the case of Pakistan, it is more critical to address its security concerns, real or imagined. In the case of India, it may be more meaningful to watch its nuclear energy and space programs. These may be for genuine civilian development purposes, but they could be diverted to the making of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. The second characteristic of the South Asian nuclear situation was the change in the direction of India's primary nuclear threat perceptions. As before, India still insists on maintaining its "nuclear option," i.e., it will neither acquire the bomb nor sign the Nuclear Non proliferation Treaty (NPT) for the present.