The law: defending Congress's interests in court: how lawmakers and the President bargain over Department of Justice representation. (Features).: An article from: Presidential Studies Quarterly

This digital document is an article from Presidential Studies Quarterly, published by Center for the Study of the Presidency on March 1, 2002. The length of the article is 6398 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

From the author: In understanding the willingness of government lawyers to defend the constitutionality of federal statutes, this article will explain why presidents rarely make use of their powers under the Constitution (allowing the president to refuse to defend laws he finds unconstitutional) and under federal law (placing the control of most government litigation with the attorney general). Attention will be paid both to how Department of Justice lawyers enhance their power by defending federal statutes and to how Congress, if need be, can pressure the department to bow to lawmaker preferences. In consequence, when the president refuses to defend a statute, courts have little reason to disregard article III constraints to resolve constitutional challenges to federal laws.

Citation Details
Title: The law: defending Congress's interests in court: how lawmakers and the President bargain over Department of Justice representation. (Features).
Author: Neal Devins
Publication:Presidential Studies Quarterly (Refereed)
Date: March 1, 2002
Publisher: Center for the Study of the Presidency
Volume: 32 Issue: 1 Page: 157(12)

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