Competitive externalities and the optimal seigniorage.: An article from: Journal of Money, Credit & Banking
Book Details
Author(s)Joshua Aizenman
PublisherOhio State University Press
ISBN / ASINB0008YWPOC
ISBN-13978B0008YWPO8
AvailabilityAvailable for download now
Sales Rank11,776,751
MarketplaceUnited States 🇺🇸
Description
This digital document is an article from Journal of Money, Credit & Banking, published by Ohio State University Press on February 1, 1992. The length of the article is 4992 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
From the supplier: This study analyzes the inflation tax in an economy with several competing decision makers, who can effectively print more money via the central bank. We derive the sequential rational expectation equilibrium, and show that the presence of competing decision makers increases the inflation rate, and may put the economy on the wrong side of the inflation tax Laffer curve. The analysis is interpreted for a country consisting of several states or provinces, where the centralized government system is weak. Similar results apply to the case of competing ministers in an economy where the central bank is weak. (Printed by permission of the publisher.)
Citation Details
Title: Competitive externalities and the optimal seigniorage.
Author: Joshua Aizenman
Publication:Journal of Money, Credit & Banking (Refereed)
Date: February 1, 1992
Publisher: Ohio State University Press
Volume: v24 Issue: n1 Page: p61(11)
Distributed by Thomson Gale
From the supplier: This study analyzes the inflation tax in an economy with several competing decision makers, who can effectively print more money via the central bank. We derive the sequential rational expectation equilibrium, and show that the presence of competing decision makers increases the inflation rate, and may put the economy on the wrong side of the inflation tax Laffer curve. The analysis is interpreted for a country consisting of several states or provinces, where the centralized government system is weak. Similar results apply to the case of competing ministers in an economy where the central bank is weak. (Printed by permission of the publisher.)
Citation Details
Title: Competitive externalities and the optimal seigniorage.
Author: Joshua Aizenman
Publication:Journal of Money, Credit & Banking (Refereed)
Date: February 1, 1992
Publisher: Ohio State University Press
Volume: v24 Issue: n1 Page: p61(11)
Distributed by Thomson Gale
