Do credit markets discipline sovereign borrowers? Evidence from U.S. states.: An article from: Journal of Money, Credit & Banking

This digital document is an article from Journal of Money, Credit & Banking, published by Ohio State University Press on November 1, 1995. The length of the article is 5205 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

From the supplier: The degree to which credit markets discipline sovereign borrowers is investigated by estimating the supply curve for debt faced by U.S. states. The results generally support an optimistic view of the market discipline hypothesis, with credit markets providing incentives for sovereign borrowers to restrain borrowing. While the risk premium on bond yields is estimated to increase only gradually at low levels of debt, this effect appears to become much larger as debt rises. There is also some evidence that credit markets may withhold access to credit at very high levels of debt. (Printed by permission of the publisher. )

Citation Details
Title: Do credit markets discipline sovereign borrowers? Evidence from U.S. states.
Author: Tamim Bayoumi
Publication:Journal of Money, Credit & Banking (Refereed)
Date: November 1, 1995
Publisher: Ohio State University Press
Volume: v27 Issue: n4 Page: p1046(14)

Distributed by Thomson Gale