De jure interstate banking: why only now?(liberalization of interstate banking regulation): An article from: Journal of Money, Credit & Banking
Book Details
Author(s)Kane, Edward J.
PublisherOhio State University Press
ISBN / ASINB00096JVAU
ISBN-13978B00096JVA9
AvailabilityAvailable for download now.
MarketplaceUnited States 🇺🇸
Description
This digital document is an article from Journal of Money, Credit & Banking, published by Ohio State University Press on May 1, 1996. The length of the article is 8893 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
From the supplier: This paper tackles three tasks. It reviews the history of restrictions on interstate banking. It summarizes the provisions of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, underscoring the opt-in and opt-out lobbying pressure this Act assigns to state legislatures. Finally, the paper develops a lobbying-pressure model designed to explain statutory changes in the framework of financial regulation. The model implies that de facto liberalization of a regulatory regime precedes its de jure liberalization. Once adopted, statutory restrictions on banks remain in place until technology and competitive regulatory enforcement have fashioned loopholes wide enough to reverse the statute-sponsoring balance of lobbying pressure. (Printed by permission of the publisher.)
Citation Details
Title: De jure interstate banking: why only now?(liberalization of interstate banking regulation)
Author: Edward J. Kane
Publication:Journal of Money, Credit & Banking (Refereed)
Date: May 1, 1996
Publisher: Ohio State University Press
Volume: v28 Issue: n2 Page: p141(21)
Distributed by Thomson Gale
From the supplier: This paper tackles three tasks. It reviews the history of restrictions on interstate banking. It summarizes the provisions of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, underscoring the opt-in and opt-out lobbying pressure this Act assigns to state legislatures. Finally, the paper develops a lobbying-pressure model designed to explain statutory changes in the framework of financial regulation. The model implies that de facto liberalization of a regulatory regime precedes its de jure liberalization. Once adopted, statutory restrictions on banks remain in place until technology and competitive regulatory enforcement have fashioned loopholes wide enough to reverse the statute-sponsoring balance of lobbying pressure. (Printed by permission of the publisher.)
Citation Details
Title: De jure interstate banking: why only now?(liberalization of interstate banking regulation)
Author: Edward J. Kane
Publication:Journal of Money, Credit & Banking (Refereed)
Date: May 1, 1996
Publisher: Ohio State University Press
Volume: v28 Issue: n2 Page: p141(21)
Distributed by Thomson Gale
