Incentives askew? Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's executive pay arrangements may be inappropriate.(Banking & Finance): An article from: Regulation
Book Details
Author(s)
William R. Emmons, Gregory E. Sierra
Publisher
Cato Institute
ISBN / ASIN
B00096T4M0
ISBN-13
978B00096T4M5
Availability
Available for download now
Sales Rank
#13,610,420
Marketplace
United States 🇺🇸
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Description
This digital document is an article from Regulation, published by Cato Institute on December 22, 2004. The length of the article is 5239 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Citation Details
Title: Incentives askew? Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's executive pay arrangements may be inappropriate.(Banking & Finance)
Author: William R. Emmons
Publication:Regulation (Refereed)
Date: December 22, 2004
Publisher: Cato Institute
Volume: 27 Issue: 4 Page: 22(7)
Distributed by Thomson Gale
Citation Details
Title: Incentives askew? Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's executive pay arrangements may be inappropriate.(Banking & Finance)
Author: William R. Emmons
Publication:Regulation (Refereed)
Date: December 22, 2004
Publisher: Cato Institute
Volume: 27 Issue: 4 Page: 22(7)
Distributed by Thomson Gale
