Insuring the agents: the role of directors' and officers' insurance in corporate governance.: An article from: Journal of Risk and Insurance

This digital document is an article from Journal of Risk and Insurance, published by American Risk and Insurance Association, Inc. on September 1, 1997. The length of the article is 4671 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

From the supplier: An examination of Holderness's monitoring hypothesis, which suggests the importance of directors' and officers' (D&O) insurance in the governance of public companies, was conducted. A sample of 366 UK companies was surveyed to study the association between managerial ownership, external shareholder control, board composition and the acquisition of D&O insurance. Findings from the study support the Holderness's hypothesis.

Citation Details
Title: Insuring the agents: the role of directors' and officers' insurance in corporate governance.
Author: Noel O'Sullivan
Publication:Journal of Risk and Insurance (Refereed)
Date: September 1, 1997
Publisher: American Risk and Insurance Association, Inc.
Volume: v64 Issue: n3 Page: p545(12)

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