Noncooperative foundations for the Kalai-Smorodinsky and equal sacrifice solutions via prominence structures.: An article from: Atlantic Economic Journal

This digital document is an article from Atlantic Economic Journal, published by Atlantic Economic Society on December 1, 1997. The length of the article is 4773 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

From the author: In bargaining, players may adopt different prominence structures when making demands: (i) each player might use (1/N)th of his maximum monetary payoff as the prominence level or (ii) players might use a common prominence level. This paper considers a scheme in which players alternate making demands. It turns out that if the prominence levels described by (i) are used and if players have utilities linear in money, the outcome of this scheme converges to that of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution as players' prominence levels get smaller. If the common prominence level of (ii) is used and if players have identical constant marginal utilities of money, the outcome of this scheme converges to that of the equal sacrifice solution as that prominence level gets smaller.

Citation Details
Title: Noncooperative foundations for the Kalai-Smorodinsky and equal sacrifice solutions via prominence structures.
Author: Nejat Anbarci
Publication:Atlantic Economic Journal (Refereed)
Date: December 1, 1997
Publisher: Atlantic Economic Society
Volume: v25 Issue: n4 Page: p403(9)

Distributed by Thomson Gale