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Functional Change and Bank Strategy in German Corporate Governance [An article from: International Review of Law & Economics]
Book Details
Author(s)D.B. Crane, U. Schaede
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000P6NVPK
ISBN-13978B000P6NVP6
AvailabilityAvailable for download now
Sales Rank12,898,019
MarketplaceUnited States 🇺🇸
Description
This digital document is a journal article from International Review of Law & Economics, published by Elsevier in 2006. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
This paper analyses changes in the German corporate governance system in the 1990s, using a functional perspective that separates the functions of governance from the institutions that perform these functions. Financial globalization, harmonized legislation within the European Union, and domestic pressures have triggered a move away from the postwar German system of bank-based governance, and towards more market-oriented processes. The paper shows that these forces have resulted in heightening transparency, more active capital markets, and a greatly reduced role of banks in the governance process. However, Germany's 2002 boycott of EU takeover legislation has created a void in the current governance system: because bank intervention and the market for corporate control are substitutes, a reduced role of a banks and protective takeover legislation mean that one important governance function is currently underserved.
Description:
This paper analyses changes in the German corporate governance system in the 1990s, using a functional perspective that separates the functions of governance from the institutions that perform these functions. Financial globalization, harmonized legislation within the European Union, and domestic pressures have triggered a move away from the postwar German system of bank-based governance, and towards more market-oriented processes. The paper shows that these forces have resulted in heightening transparency, more active capital markets, and a greatly reduced role of banks in the governance process. However, Germany's 2002 boycott of EU takeover legislation has created a void in the current governance system: because bank intervention and the market for corporate control are substitutes, a reduced role of a banks and protective takeover legislation mean that one important governance function is currently underserved.
