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Descent rules and strategic transfers. Evidence from matrilineal groups in Ghana [An article from: Journal of Development Economics]
Book Details
Author(s)E. La Ferrara
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000PDYNEQ
ISBN-13978B000PDYNE2
AvailabilityAvailable for download now
MarketplaceUnited States 🇺🇸
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Development Economics, published by Elsevier in 2007. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
Traditional descent systems can roughly be divided into patrilineal and matrilineal. In the latter, a man's heir is not his own child but rather his sister's son. The paper examines the implications of this social norm for the pattern of inter-vivos transfers using household level data from rural Ghana, where the largest ethnic group is traditionally matrilineal. In particular, it tests the predictions of a model of strategic behavior according to which children should respond to the threat of disinheritance by increasing transfers to their parents during lifetime to induce a donation of land before the default (matrilineal) inheritance is enforced. I find that the credibility of customary norms enforcement, as proxied by the presence of a nephew in the father's household, significantly increases the probability of receiving transfers from children for Akans but not for the other groups. The effect is specific to nephews and not to other co-resident boys. This pattern of behavior can affect asset accumulation decisions across generations.
Description:
Traditional descent systems can roughly be divided into patrilineal and matrilineal. In the latter, a man's heir is not his own child but rather his sister's son. The paper examines the implications of this social norm for the pattern of inter-vivos transfers using household level data from rural Ghana, where the largest ethnic group is traditionally matrilineal. In particular, it tests the predictions of a model of strategic behavior according to which children should respond to the threat of disinheritance by increasing transfers to their parents during lifetime to induce a donation of land before the default (matrilineal) inheritance is enforced. I find that the credibility of customary norms enforcement, as proxied by the presence of a nephew in the father's household, significantly increases the probability of receiving transfers from children for Akans but not for the other groups. The effect is specific to nephews and not to other co-resident boys. This pattern of behavior can affect asset accumulation decisions across generations.
