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Tacit collusion and international commodity taxation [An article from: Journal of Public Economics]
Book Details
Author(s)A. Haufler, G. Schjelderup
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000RQYSH8
ISBN-13978B000RQYSH2
AvailabilityAvailable for download now
MarketplaceUnited States 🇺🇸
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Public Economics, published by Elsevier in 2004. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
The paper employs a model of dynamic price competition to study how international commodity taxation affects the stability of collusive agreements when producers in an international duopoly agree not to export into each other's home market. We consider both the choice of international tax principle and the harmonization of tax rates and differentiate between a setting where production costs differ between countries, and a setting where exogenous tax rate differentials are the only asymmetry. The conclusions derived from this model differ strongly from those obtained under the assumption of competitive product markets.
Description:
The paper employs a model of dynamic price competition to study how international commodity taxation affects the stability of collusive agreements when producers in an international duopoly agree not to export into each other's home market. We consider both the choice of international tax principle and the harmonization of tax rates and differentiate between a setting where production costs differ between countries, and a setting where exogenous tax rate differentials are the only asymmetry. The conclusions derived from this model differ strongly from those obtained under the assumption of competitive product markets.
