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Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions [An article from: Journal of Economic Theory]
Book Details
Author(s)
H. Hong, M. Shum
Publisher
Elsevier
ISBN / ASIN
B000RQZ5F2
ISBN-13
978B000RQZ5F7
Availability
Available for download now
Marketplace
United States 🇺🇸
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Economic Theory, published by Elsevier in 2004. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
We study the rates at which transaction prices aggregate information in common value auctions under the different information structures in Wilson (Rev. Econ. Stud. 44 (1977) 511) and Pesendorfer and Swinkels (Econometrica 65 (1997) 1247). We consider uniform-price auctions in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned to n bidders, where both n and k are allowed to diverge to infinity, and k/n converges to a number in [0,1). The Wilson assumptions lead to information aggregation at a rate proportional to n/k, but the price aggregates information at a rate proportional to k in the PS setting. We also consider English auctions, and investigate whether the extra information revealed in equilibrium improves convergence rates in these auctions.
Description:
We study the rates at which transaction prices aggregate information in common value auctions under the different information structures in Wilson (Rev. Econ. Stud. 44 (1977) 511) and Pesendorfer and Swinkels (Econometrica 65 (1997) 1247). We consider uniform-price auctions in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned to n bidders, where both n and k are allowed to diverge to infinity, and k/n converges to a number in [0,1). The Wilson assumptions lead to information aggregation at a rate proportional to n/k, but the price aggregates information at a rate proportional to k in the PS setting. We also consider English auctions, and investigate whether the extra information revealed in equilibrium improves convergence rates in these auctions.
