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On Stackelberg games in a homogeneous product market [An article from: European Economic Review]
Book Details
Author(s)K.G. Dastidar
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000RR097U
ISBN-13978B000RR0972
MarketplaceFrance 🇫🇷
Description
This digital document is a journal article from European Economic Review, published by Elsevier in 2004. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
In a homogeneous product duopoly with concave demand and strictly convex costs we bring together all the standard results of quantity Stackelberg games, provide some new results with price Stackelberg games and compare the equilibrium configuration of the quantity games with the price games. In the price Stackelberg game we show there is a unique SPNE where the leader chooses a lower price than the follower, but both get equal payoffs. We prove that generally quantity Stackelberg games are less competitive than price Stackelberg games. However, we also demonstrate the possibility of a reversal of this result.
Description:
In a homogeneous product duopoly with concave demand and strictly convex costs we bring together all the standard results of quantity Stackelberg games, provide some new results with price Stackelberg games and compare the equilibrium configuration of the quantity games with the price games. In the price Stackelberg game we show there is a unique SPNE where the leader chooses a lower price than the follower, but both get equal payoffs. We prove that generally quantity Stackelberg games are less competitive than price Stackelberg games. However, we also demonstrate the possibility of a reversal of this result.
