![Competition between insurers with superior information [An article from: European Economic Review]](https://www.ebooknetworking.net/books/B00/0RR/bigB000RR3O7C.jpg)
Competition between insurers with superior information [An article from: European Economic Review]
Book Details
Author(s)B. Villeneuve
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000RR3O7C
ISBN-13978B000RR3O72
AvailabilityAvailable for download now
MarketplaceUnited States 🇺🇸
Description
This digital document is a journal article from European Economic Review, published by Elsevier in 2005. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
We analyze markets where insurers are better informed about risk than consumers. We show that even competitive markets may result in insufficient information revelation and inefficient insurance coverage. This explains why certain risky consumers remain uninsured and why certain market segments are persistently profitable. We also show robustness to competition in menus or mechanisms. Our analysis of the ''contrary of adverse selection'' (competition between principals with common value and exclusivity) is suitable for other markets (lawyers, doctors, mechanics, etc.).
Description:
We analyze markets where insurers are better informed about risk than consumers. We show that even competitive markets may result in insufficient information revelation and inefficient insurance coverage. This explains why certain risky consumers remain uninsured and why certain market segments are persistently profitable. We also show robustness to competition in menus or mechanisms. Our analysis of the ''contrary of adverse selection'' (competition between principals with common value and exclusivity) is suitable for other markets (lawyers, doctors, mechanics, etc.).
