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Stabilizing non-fundamental asset price movements under discretion and limited information [An article from: Journal of Monetary Economics]
Book Details
Author(s)B. Dupor
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000RR46CY
ISBN-13978B000RR46C4
AvailabilityAvailable for download now
MarketplaceUnited States 🇺🇸
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Monetary Economics, published by Elsevier in 2005. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
Inflation, output and interest rate stabilization are all potential central bank objectives. We explore whether monetary policy should respond to asset price fluctuations when they are driven by irrational expectational shocks to the future returns to capital. In our model, an optimistic shock to future returns generates both an increase in equity prices and physical investment. The increased investment is inefficient and, thus, a central bank optimally responds to this expectations shocks. This induces a trade-off between stabilizing nominal prices and non-fundamental asset price movements. We compare the optimal policy under different assumptions: full versus limited information and commitment versus discretion. If the central bank has limited information about whether an asset price movement has a fundamental or non-fundamental origin, then the central bank responds less aggressively to the non-fundamental exuberance shocks than under full information. Without commitment, a central bank responds more aggressively to non-fundamental exuberance shocks.
Description:
Inflation, output and interest rate stabilization are all potential central bank objectives. We explore whether monetary policy should respond to asset price fluctuations when they are driven by irrational expectational shocks to the future returns to capital. In our model, an optimistic shock to future returns generates both an increase in equity prices and physical investment. The increased investment is inefficient and, thus, a central bank optimally responds to this expectations shocks. This induces a trade-off between stabilizing nominal prices and non-fundamental asset price movements. We compare the optimal policy under different assumptions: full versus limited information and commitment versus discretion. If the central bank has limited information about whether an asset price movement has a fundamental or non-fundamental origin, then the central bank responds less aggressively to the non-fundamental exuberance shocks than under full information. Without commitment, a central bank responds more aggressively to non-fundamental exuberance shocks.
