Lessons from the deregulation transition in Chile's local telephony market [An article from: Telecommunications Policy]

This digital document is a journal article from Telecommunications Policy, published by Elsevier in 2005. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

Description:
There is no experience in the world where entry to local telephony has been as significant as in Chile. This paper addresses two related questions: (i) whether the local telephony segment in Chile is competitive enough so as to deregulate rates and (ii) whether competition thus far achieved could be at risk in the case where asymmetric regulation is ended. The paper suggests that the market is competitive enough, that the regulation mechanism is extremely costly, and that subsidizing entry in order to have infrastructure competition is not necessary. It concludes that deregulation of consumer's rates would be in their own consumers' interest.