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Continuous-time games of timing [An article from: Journal of Economic Theory]
Book Details
Author(s)R. Laraki, E. Solan, N. Vieille
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000RR4PFC
ISBN-13978B000RR4PF0
AvailabilityAvailable for download now
Sales Rank11,164,841
MarketplaceUnited States 🇺🇸
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Economic Theory, published by Elsevier in 2005. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect @e-equilibrium, for each @e>0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established.
Description:
We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect @e-equilibrium, for each @e>0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established.
