Bank privatization in Argentina: A model of political constraints and differential outcomes [An article from: Journal of Development Economics]

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Description:
Although case studies suggest that political constraints affect bank privatization transactions, these constraints have been neither theoretically modeled nor econometrically tested. This paper presents a simple model of the tradeoffs governments and buyers face during these transactions. In addition to price, the buyer is concerned about solvency and profitability following privatization. Similarly, politicians are concerned about layoffs and service coverage. We apply the framework to provincial bank privatizations in Argentina, finding that provinces with fiscal problems were willing to accept more layoffs and guarantee more of the privatized bank's portfolio in return for a higher price.