The Equal Protection Clause (Constitutional Law Series)

THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of 236 U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze, interpret and apply the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. The selection of decisions spans from 2004 to the date of publication.

The Equal Protection Clause provides, "No State shall . . . deny to any persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. "The purpose of the equal protection clause . . . is to secure every person within the state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents." Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Twp., 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918). Unequal treatment of "'those who are entitled to be treated alike[] is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination.'" Batra v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb., 79 F.3d 717, 721 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944)). "The good faith of [state] officers and the validity of their actions are presumed; when assailed, the burden of proof is upon the complaining party." Sunday Lake, 247 U.S. at 353. Without more, "opprobrious epithets" like "'willful' and 'malicious'" and characterizations of [ ] conduct "as an unequal, unjust, and oppressive administration of the laws" are not enough. Snowden, 321 U.S. at 10. Robbins v. Becker, (8th Cir. 2015).

The Equal Protection Clause does not require identical treatment; rather, it "guarantees that the government will not classify individuals on the basis of impermissible criteria." Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 1997). Because "legislative classifications as a general rule are presumptively valid under the Equal Protection Clause," [courts] ordinarily must uphold a legislative classification if it is "'rationally related to a legitimate state interest.'" Id. (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)). Seeboth v. Allenby, (9th Cir. 2015).

Certain exceptions to that general rule trigger heightened judicial scrutiny. If the classification targets a suspect class or burdens the exercise of a fundamental right, we apply strict scrutiny and ask whether the statute is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Wright v. Incline Vill. Gen. Improvement Dist., 665 F.3d 1128, 1141 (9th Cir. 2011). If a law discriminates against a quasi-suspect class, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny; to survive a constitutional challenge, such discrimination must substantially relate to an important governmental objective. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 479-80 (9th Cir. 2014), petitions for cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3589 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2014) (No. 14-765), (U.S. Jan. 2, 2015) (No. 14-788), and (U.S. Apr. 9, 2015) (No. 14-1214). Seeboth v. Allenby, ibid.

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