Search Books

The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford Legal Philosophy)

Author Victor Tadros
Publisher Oxford University Press
📄 Viewing lite version Full site ›
🌎 Shop on Amazon — choose country
35.95 USD
🛒 Buy New on Amazon 🇺🇸 🏷 Buy Used — $27.00

✓ Usually ships in 24 hours

Share:
Book Details
Author(s)Victor Tadros
ISBN / ASIN0199681910
ISBN-139780199681914
AvailabilityUsually ships in 24 hours
Sales Rank821,477
MarketplaceUnited States 🇺🇸

Description

Every modern democratic state imprisons thousands of offenders every year, depriving them of their liberty, causing them a great deal of psychological and sometimes physical harm. Relationships are destroyed, jobs are lost, the risk of the offender being harmed by other offenders is increased and all at great expense to the state.

How can this brutal and costly enterprise be justified? Traditionally, philosophers answering this question have argued either that the punishment of wrongdoers is a good in itself (retributivism), or that it is a regrettable means to a valuable end, such as the deterrence of future wrongdoing, and thus justifiable on consequentialist grounds. This book offers a critical examination of those theories and advances a new argument for punishment's justification, calling it the 'duty view'. On this view, the permission to punish offenders is grounded in the duties that they incur in virtue of their wrongdoing. The most important duties that ground the justification of punishment are the duty to recognize that the offender has done wrong and the duty to protect others against wrongdoing. In the light of these duties the state has a permission to punish offenders to ensure that they recognize that what they have done is wrong, but also to protect others from crime.

In contrast to other justifications of punishment grounded in deterrence, the duty view is developed in the light of a non-consequentialist moral theory: a theory which endorses constraints on the pursuit of the good. It is shown that it is normally wrong to harm a person as a means to pursue a greater good. However, there are exceptions to this principle in cases where the person harmed has an enforceable duty to pursue the good. The implications of this idea are explored both in the context of self-defense, and then in the context of punishment. Through the systematic exploration of the relationship between self-defense and punishment, the book makes significant