How and why do countries bargain together in world affairs? Why are such coalitions crucial to developing nations? What effects do these blocs have on world affairs?
This new study asks and answers these key questions, showing why successful coalition building is a difficult and expensive process: allies need to be carefully identified, large numbers do not always mean a proportionate increase in influence. The weak have the choice of teaming up against or jumping on the bandwagon with the strong. Even after it has been organized, collective action entails costs of many kinds.
This book also investigates the relevance and workability of coalitions as an instrument of bargaining power for the weak. More specifically, it analyzes the coalition strategies of developing countries at the inter-state level, particularly in the context of international trade.
Given the nature of this enquiry, this new study uses theoretical and empirical methods to complement each other. Through new case-studies of the Uruguay Round and an analytical overview of more recent coalitions, this is an important contribution to international political economy and international relations, where most GATT/WTO-based coalitions have eluded record.
This book will be of great interest to all students of international relations, politics and globalization.