CRS Report for Congress: Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy

The uprising that began in Bahrain on February 14, 2011, following the revolt that overthrew
Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak three days earlier, began a political crisis that defies easy
resolution. The unrest demonstrates that the grievances of the Shiite majority over the distribution
of power and economic opportunities were not satisfied by the efforts during 1999-2010 to
increase the role of the Shiite majority in governance. Bahraini Shiites say they demand a
constitutional monarchy in which an elected parliament produces the government, but the Sunni
minority believes the Shiites want nothing less than outright rule.
In March 2011, Bahrain's government rejected U.S. advice by inviting direct security assistance
from other Gulf Cooperation Council countries, declaring a state of emergency, forcefully
suppressing demonstrations, and arresting dissident leaders and pro-opposition health care
workers. Although the state of emergency ended on June 1, 2011, the continued imprisonment of
dissidents contributed to the resulting failure of a "national dialogue," held in July 2011, to reach
agreement on more than just a few political reform recommendations. Hopes for resolution were
raised by a pivotal report by a government-appointed "Independent Commission of Inquiry"
(BICI) on the unrest, released November 23, 2011, which was critical of the government's actions
against the unrest as well as the opposition's responses to government proposals early in the
crisis. The government asserts it has implemented many of the BICI recommendations-an
assertion largely corroborated on March 20, 2012, by a national commission appointed to oversee
implementation-and says it will institute the remainder. However, stalemate on major political
reforms has contributed to the continuation of significant demonstrations and dashed hopes that a
complete solution is in sight.