The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches - managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory - and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed.
A timely study of a controversial topic, this Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business, and accounting.
Contributors: C. Amatucci, R. Bender, S. Bhagat, W. Bratton, S. Chahine, R. Chakrabarti, M.J. Conyon, G. Ferrarini, M. Firth, M. Goergen, B. Haar, L. He, M.T. Henderson, J.G. Hill, K. Kubo, T.Y. Leung, G. Loutzenhiser, M. Lubrano di Scorpaniello, J.A. McCahery, N. Moloney, K.J. Murphy, L. Oxelheim, L. Renneboog, R. Romano, O.M. Rui, Z. Sautner, K. Sheehan, K. Subramanian, R.S. Thomas, S. Thompson, G. Trojanowski, H. Wells, C. Wihlborg, J. Winter, P.K. Yadav, Y. Yadav, J. Zhang