Transatlantic Public Opinion on War: Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq

This book analyses transatlantic public opinion on post-Cold War era military operations in Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003). It surges into the differences recorded in the transatlantic relations and the growing asymmetry between the publics of the two poles in assessing the military engagements, especially over the use of force in the post-Cold War period. Confronted with the need to examine broader correlations between trends in wars and trends in public opinion, this book generates the polygonal hypothesis that “military operations taken at a “high-risk level” with “high costs” inevitably downgrades the acceptable utility hence public support for the action, while use of force with the principal objective of “foreign policy restraint” encourages popular support”. The main implication of this book is as straightforward as it is important: ‘the persistence of traditional Cold War concerns and continuation of realist way of thinking rather than speaking of ideals and values shape public opinion on use of force in post-Cold War era’.