Central bank independence.: An article from: Finance & Development

This digital document is an article from Finance & Development, published by International Monetary Fund on March 1, 1992. The length of the article is 2901 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

From the supplier: A strong argument could be made in favor of central bank independence as such a set-up has the potential to improve long-term inflation performance. A key point that must be considered is that the detail of the institutional framework is likely to be an important determinant of the contribution that central bank independence could provide in practice to price stability and to the sustainability of such independence. The success of such a central banking framework would be largely dependent on the nature of informal institutional arrangements under which central bankers and politicians would operate. Therefore, any legislation to reform the system should ensure that the structuring of these informal government-central bank relationships be scrutinized to ensure that the degree of monetary policy transparency required be maintained to ensure that key policy objectives are met.

Citation Details
Title: Central bank independence.
Author: Marta Castello-Branco
Publication:Finance & Development (Magazine/Journal)
Date: March 1, 1992
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Volume: v29 Issue: n1 Page: p19(3)

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