How auctions reveal information: a case study on German REPO rates.: An article from: Journal of Money, Credit & Banking

This digital document is an article from Journal of Money, Credit & Banking, published by Ohio State University Press on February 1, 1997. The length of the article is 3812 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

From the supplier: Securities repurchase agreements (REPOs) have become the Bundesbank's most important tool for its ongoing money market management and the control of the monetary base. In the fall of 1988, the Bundesbank changed the applied auction rule in order to prevent banks from submitting exaggerated bids. Focusing on the information content of a resulting REPO rate, this paper investigates how German money market rates react to auction results. Evidence will be found that the response of the money market to a new REPO rate reflects the applied auction rule. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

Citation Details
Title: How auctions reveal information: a case study on German REPO rates.
Author: Dieter Nautz
Publication:Journal of Money, Credit & Banking (Refereed)
Date: February 1, 1997
Publisher: Ohio State University Press
Volume: v29 Issue: n1 Page: p17(10)

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