Price discovery in combinatorial auctions using Gibbs Sampling [An article from: Decision Support Systems]

This digital document is a journal article from Decision Support Systems, published by Elsevier in 2006. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

Description:
Considerable research discusses the advantages and disadvantages of combinatorial auctions. This study addresses a disadvantage, the loss of price discovery for the individual items sold as bundles. Prior studies confirm that there may not be a unique unit-level equilibrium price. We claim a distribution of prices satisfy a given allocation and describe a technique to determine these distributions. Gibbs Sampling allows us to discover characteristics of combinatorial auctions based on the allocated bids. We extract the market-influenced unit-level price, bidder profit, reservation discount distributions and are able to find patterns that depict synergies between products. The posterior distribution provides insights useful to managerial decision making.