Multi-criteria auctions without full comparability of bids [An article from: European Journal of Operational Research]

This digital document is a journal article from European Journal of Operational Research, published by Elsevier in 2007. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

Description:
The emergence of auction mechanisms that support bids characterized by several attributes is one of the most recent evolutions within auction theory. These mechanisms, referred to as multi-attribute, multiple issue or multi-dimensional auctions, are at the intersection between multi-criteria decision and auction theories. The purpose of this paper is to introduce multi-criteria auctions the originality of which is not to require full comparability between bids. We claim that this distinctive feature is of great interest, especially in procurement situations. Furthermore, the existence of potential incomparability between multi-dimensional offers will permit us to manage different bidding niches coexisting within the same bidding space. A theoretical framework based on a general preference structure will be introduced and then referenced to existing approaches such as multi-attribute auctions or new ones such as dominance based multi-criteria auctions or butterfly auctions.