Switching costs and adverse selection in the market for credit cards: New evidence [An article from: Journal of Banking and Finance]

This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Banking and Finance, published by Elsevier in 2006. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

Description:
To explain persistence of credit card interest rates at relatively high levels, Calem and Mester (AER, 1995) argued that informational barriers create switching costs for high-balance customers. As evidence, using data from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances, they showed that these households were more likely to be rejected when applying for new credit. In this paper, we revisit the question using the 1998 and 2001 SCF. Further, we use new information on card interest rates to test for pricing effects consistent with information-based switching costs. We find that informational barriers to competition persist, although their role may have declined.