A CONTEMPORARY "BLUEPRINT" FOR NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION PROVISIONAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN AFGHANISTAN?

This paper examines how the nature of the contemporary conflict environment shapes the military contribution to interagency operations. Modern conflict is increasingly centered on a changed manifestation of war from a contest between state based massed armies to also include a range of non state actors in dynamic tension, within a complex operational environment. The nature of conflict remains essentially political, resting on a contest of wills to shape and influence popular perceptions, but has been made increasingly difficult through the four interrelated trends of complexity, diversity, diffusion and lethality. Within this arena, control of populations and perceptions is the decisive and central event, with battle being a means to an end. Battlefields are now more often social structures than terrain, with ideas as weapons, human minds the targets and the will of the people the prize. Success in this new contest of wills requires more than application of conventional military force alone, but rather a comprehensive interagency approach to operations. However, this paper finds that in reality the United States will continue to depend on the military to shoulder the operational burden normally carried by other agencies. Whilst recognizing the desire to involve other agencies in seeking to resolve contemporary conflict, institutional circumstances and operational imperatives offer little other choice. These essential actions by the military reflect the broader interpretation of contemporary security and the need to provide such assistance quickly in the absence of other agencies. To not do so reduces the initial degree of influence able to be established by occupying forces over indigenous populations. In an era of globalised communications and continuous media coverage, these gaps of influence are able to be readily exploited by adversaries, with the attendant risk of prolonged conflict and unfavorable outcomes, as evident in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters. The transformation from the Cold War continues. The United States government institutions and frameworks for security have not kept pace with the changes evident in the new security environment and world disorder. Until these institutions and processes change, or the nature of the operational and global security environments reverts to a world for which those institutions and processes were designed, the military must remain prepared to be the force of choice in interagency operations. Indeed, as this paper concludes, the military must remain the force of no choice.