Eftikhar Khan Pakistan's half European Commander and Battle of Chamb 1971

Moltke went further and said: Everything comes to this; To be able to recognise the changed situation and order the foreseeable course and prepare it energeticallyÓ. (Refers- Military Works-Moltke-earlier quoted-Volume Four-pages 1, 71-73). The position of 23 Division after the failure in the north on 04 and 05 December was similar to that confronted by the Indian Armour GOC opposite Chawinda in 1965 and the Pakistani Armour GOC opposite Valtoha after failure of 4 Armoured Brigade attack.GOC 23 Divison had much less resources than both of the commanders just mentioned. Yet he remained calm, resolute and optimistic and brilliantly modified his plan to once again attack in the south at Chak Pandit.Thus General Eftikhar was able to pierce the veil of darkness with his rapier like operational vision; overcoming all the stumbling blocks in his way; facing the barrage of conflicting information passed on through the subjective process of distortion of informaiton; as it is passed from the lower to the higher echelons in crisis situation. In Clausewitzian terms General Eftikhar whose generalship and personality comes closest to the Clausewitzian frame of the ideal military commander as far as Indo-Pak sub-continent is concerned Òstood like a rock against which the sea breaks. Its fury in vainÓ. (Refers-On War-Clausewitz-Anatol Rapoport-National Book Foundation-page-163). John Keegan describes the German definition of operational strategy in the following words:-ÒEven higher in the German armyÕs scale of values than the nature of the warrior spirit in its conscripts stood the cultivation of operational talent in their leaders. Operative is an adjective which does not translate exactly into English military vocabulary. Lying somewhere between ÒStrategicÓ and ÒTacticalÓ, it describes the process of transforming paper plans into battlefield practice, against the tactical pressures of time which the strategist does not know, and has been regarded by the German army as the most difficult of the commanders art since it was isolated by the great Moltke in the 1860s. Taught in so far as it can be taught, in his famous staff college courses, its traits were eagerly looked for in the performance of general staff candidates and its manifestation in practice. In war time it was rewarded by swift promotion".(Refers-Six Armies in Normandy-John Keegan-Fontana Books-Reprint-1985-Page.238) LEADING FROM THE FRONT It was leading from the front for which General Eftikhar is remembered even today by the troops who served in 23 Division during the Battle of Chamb. It was this quality which enabled him to arrive at a realisttic appraisal of the actual situation without undue reliance on exaggerated reports from lower echelons.Absence of this doctrine or system of command due to the British heritage at brigade and divisional level, however, led to certain command failures at the Brigade level. The Pakistan and Indian armies are basically the continuation of the old British Indian army steeped in a system of command in which the GOC and Brigade Commanders rarely left their headquarters; placing full trust in the fighting ability of the battalion commanders fighting the main battle. EftikharÕs approach was more close to the German way of war. Thus while he himself was leading from the front; others like the brigade commanders were not doing so.On the other hand the staff officer in the British/Indo-Pak system had a lesser mission oriented and independent role than the German General Staff which led to breakdown in command. Staff officers trained in the British way of war were not trained to think independently; thus there were no Westphals or Mellenthin to keep the things rolling while the Pakistani Rommel was moving with the leading tank troop. Similarly there were no Neumann, Silkows and Suemermann among the Brigade Commanders who fought from the front.Thus 4 AK Brigade and 66 Brigade Commanders were not accustomed to the system of ....