A Handbook of Alternative Theories of Public Economics

'A Handbook of Alternative Theories of Public Economics is especially welcome because it gathers studies on the problems of public economics from widely different angles. Long gone is the time when it was enough to study Musgrave to be up to date in the economics of government and social welfare. The field is now hotly disputed, so that this Handbook will prove informative about parts of the literature of which the specialist may be unaware. Prof. Forte, the principal editor, is co-author of four empirical studies on questions of the size, the finance and some particular effects of government. One of these is within a section on 'Public bads' that includes articles on corruption and the informal economy not usually found in texts on public economics. There are essays extending the research programme of the Austrian School on the State to cycle theory and the euro. No less interesting are the articles on government failure. For me the collection has proved especially interesting for the number of essays on justice, fairness, utility and rationality: it is very convenient to have the different approaches to these contentious questions treated with no attempt to paper over the cracks.'
- Pedro Schwartz, San Pablo University, Madrid, Spain

This comprehensive and thought-provoking Handbook reviews public sector economics from pluralist perspectives that either complement or reach beyond mainstream views.

The book takes a comprehensive interdisciplinary approach, drawing on economic elements in the fields of philosophy, sociology, psychology, history and law. The expert contributors present new methodological approaches across these disciplines in five distinct sections:

- 'Revisiting the Theoretical Foundations' compares and contrasts Austrians, Marxists, public choice theorists and Keynesians
- 'Revisiting the Values' is concerned with justice, welfare, religions and civil rights
- 'Beyond Rationalistic Rational Choice' includes chapters devoted to memory, information and group motivation
- The final sections on 'Optimal Government and Government Failure' and 'Public Economics of Public Bads' deal with competition among governments, their suboptimal size, regulation, corruption, the informal economy, cognitive dissonance, rent seeking, the UN and criminal cycles.

Academics, researchers and students with an interest in economics - particularly public sector economics and Austrian economics and public policy will find this Handbook to be an invaluable reference tool.

Contributors: F. Acacia, J. Alm, G. Brady, G. Brosio, M. Caputo, M. Casson, G. Coco, M. Cubel Sanchez, S. Fedeli, M. Florio, F. Forte, N. Goldschmit, A. Habisch, M. Holler, J. Huerta de Soto, J.P. Jimenez, A. Koziashvili, M.A. Leroch, C. Magazzino, M. Mantovani, D. Montolio, R. Mudami, D.C. Mueller, S. Nitzan, D.M.A. Patti, P. Salin, P. Salmon, F. Sobbrio, V. Tanzi, Y. Tobol, B.A. Wickström, R. Zanola