Collective Dominance in EC Competition Law: Role of Structural Links: Case Law Analysis under the EC Merger Regulation

One of the key objectives behind the ECMR (European Communities Merger Regulation) is to prevent concentration leading to creation or strengthening of a dominant position which is prohibited by Article 2(3). However, the reference to single undertaking in Article 2(3) of ECMR has raised a number of questions as to the applicability of the concept of collective dominance under the ECMR. Even where it is accepted that the concept is applicable, uncertainties remain as to the extent of applicability. Neither the original rules on competition in the EC Treaty nor the ECMR itself is clear enough to ascertain whether behavioral or structural controls could be used to prevent or regulate collective dominance in oligopolistic markets. One of the important questions in EC Competition Law is whether the dominance by a group of undertakings is the same as the dominance by a single firm. This work attempts to clarify this issue by analyzing the relevant EC case law. It analyses economic links between the members of oligopoly in order to detect potential collective dominant position that might be significantly impeding the effective competition within the Common Market.