Two Logics: The Conflict Between Classical and Neo-Analytic Philosophy

Introduction: the battle of the books renewed -- A logic that can't say what anything is -- Alternative logics: a what-logic and a relating-logic -- The what-statements of a what-logic: why they are not analytic truths -- The what-statements of a what-logic: why they are not synthetic truths -- The disabilities of a relating-logic: the fallacy of inverted intentionality -- The world as seen through a relating-logic -- A what-logic and its supposed commitment to essences and substantial forms -- Induction as conceived by a relating-logic and a what-logic -- The picture of the world derived from the inductions in a relating-logic -- Deductive explanation: a likely case study in surrealism? -- From deductive explanation in general to historical explanation in particular -- A short digression from history into ethics -- Conclusion: epilogue or epitaph?