Monetary policy games and central bank politics.: An article from: Journal of Money, Credit & Banking
Book Details
Author(s)Christopher J. Waller
PublisherOhio State University Press
ISBN / ASINB0008MFM76
ISBN-13978B0008MFM77
MarketplaceFrance 🇫🇷
Description
This digital document is an article from Journal of Money, Credit & Banking, published by Ohio State University Press on November 1, 1989. The length of the article is 3849 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
From the supplier: This paper incorporates a central bank with an overlapping term of office structure into a rational business cycle model characterized by partisan competition. The incumbency structure of the central bank board signals information to private agents concerning forthcoming policy actions thereby reducing inflation uncertainty. This structure of the board also serves to limit, in a particular way, the political influence on the setting of monetary policy which, in turn, reduces the inflationary bias and excessive output variability that would otherwise arise in this model. (Printed by permission of the publisher.)
Citation Details
Title: Monetary policy games and central bank politics.
Author: Christopher J. Waller
Publication:Journal of Money, Credit & Banking (Refereed)
Date: November 1, 1989
Publisher: Ohio State University Press
Volume: v21 Issue: n4 Page: p422(10)
Distributed by Thomson Gale
From the supplier: This paper incorporates a central bank with an overlapping term of office structure into a rational business cycle model characterized by partisan competition. The incumbency structure of the central bank board signals information to private agents concerning forthcoming policy actions thereby reducing inflation uncertainty. This structure of the board also serves to limit, in a particular way, the political influence on the setting of monetary policy which, in turn, reduces the inflationary bias and excessive output variability that would otherwise arise in this model. (Printed by permission of the publisher.)
Citation Details
Title: Monetary policy games and central bank politics.
Author: Christopher J. Waller
Publication:Journal of Money, Credit & Banking (Refereed)
Date: November 1, 1989
Publisher: Ohio State University Press
Volume: v21 Issue: n4 Page: p422(10)
Distributed by Thomson Gale
