Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: some comparative evidence.: An article from: Journal of Money, Credit & Banking

This digital document is an article from Journal of Money, Credit & Banking, published by Ohio State University Press on May 1, 1993. The length of the article is 2679 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

From the supplier: This note uses information on a sample of 16 OECD countries to assess the relationship between Central Bank independence and macroeconomic performance. As previous work suggests, politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation. However, we find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth, unemployment or the ex ante real interest rate. (Printed by permission of the publisher.)

Citation Details
Title: Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: some comparative evidence.
Author: Alberto Alesina
Publication:Journal of Money, Credit & Banking (Refereed)
Date: May 1, 1993
Publisher: Ohio State University Press
Volume: v25 Issue: n2 Page: p151(12)

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