Wages and the intensity of labor effort: efficiency wages versus compensating payments.: An article from: Southern Economic Journal

This digital document is an article from Southern Economic Journal, published by Southern Economic Association on July 1, 1994. The length of the article is 6179 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

From the supplier: Firms resort to efficiency wages and compensating payments in an effort to increase work intensity among their employees. Empirical testing of efficiency wages and compensating payments can be facilitated through the use of an estimated set of structural equations. Results indicate that work intensity increases with higher efficiency wages. However, positive compensating payments do not increase labor intensity.

Citation Details
Title: Wages and the intensity of labor effort: efficiency wages versus compensating payments.
Author: David Fairris
Publication:Southern Economic Journal (Refereed)
Date: July 1, 1994
Publisher: Southern Economic Association
Volume: v61 Issue: n1 Page: p149(12)

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