Incentive conflicts and portfolio choice in the insurance industry.: An article from: Journal of Risk and Insurance

This digital document is an article from Journal of Risk and Insurance, published by American Risk and Insurance Association, Inc. on December 1, 1992. The length of the article is 2684 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

From the supplier: The behavior of shareholders in insurance firms is modeled under uncertainty using a stochastic dominance framework. Results show that low equity investors are more likely to select portfolios with higher risks. Greater losses for employees and shareholders result when the firm becomes insolvent. This implies that stockholders should ensure the prevention of wealth transfers by limiting investment and dividend policies and setting equity levels.

Citation Details
Title: Incentive conflicts and portfolio choice in the insurance industry.
Author: David F. Babbel
Publication:Journal of Risk and Insurance (Refereed)
Date: December 1, 1992
Publisher: American Risk and Insurance Association, Inc.
Volume: v59 Issue: n4 Page: p645(10)

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