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Political relationships, global financing, and corporate transparency: [An article from: Journal of Financial Economics]
Book Details
Author(s)C. Leuz, F. Oberholzer-Gee
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000P6O9XI
ISBN-13978B000P6O9X7
MarketplaceFrance 🇫🇷
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Financial Economics, published by Elsevier in 2006. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
This study examines the role of political connections in firms' financing strategies and their long-run performance. We view political connections as an example for domestic arrangements which can reduce the benefits of global financing. Using data from Indonesia, we find that firms with strong political connections are less likely to have publicly traded foreign securities. As a result, estimates of the performance consequences of foreign financing are severely biased if value-creating domestic arrangements such as political relationships are ignored. Connections not only alter firms' financing strategies, they also influence long-run performance. Tracking returns across several regimes, we show that firms have difficulty re-establishing connections with a new government when their patron falls from power, leading closely connected firms to underperform under the new regime and subsequently to increase their foreign financing.
Description:
This study examines the role of political connections in firms' financing strategies and their long-run performance. We view political connections as an example for domestic arrangements which can reduce the benefits of global financing. Using data from Indonesia, we find that firms with strong political connections are less likely to have publicly traded foreign securities. As a result, estimates of the performance consequences of foreign financing are severely biased if value-creating domestic arrangements such as political relationships are ignored. Connections not only alter firms' financing strategies, they also influence long-run performance. Tracking returns across several regimes, we show that firms have difficulty re-establishing connections with a new government when their patron falls from power, leading closely connected firms to underperform under the new regime and subsequently to increase their foreign financing.
