![Why firm access to the bond market differs over the business cycle: A theory and some evidence [An article from: Journal of Banking and Finance]](https://www.ebooknetworking.net/books/B00/0P6/bigB000P6ONIO.jpg)
Why firm access to the bond market differs over the business cycle: A theory and some evidence [An article from: Journal of Banking and Finance]
Book Details
Author(s)J.A.C. Santos
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000P6ONIO
ISBN-13978B000P6ONI6
MarketplaceIndia 🇮🇳
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Banking and Finance, published by Elsevier in 2006. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
This paper presents a theory of firm access to the bond market in which information gathering agencies are valuable but alter the relative cost of bond financing across firms and over the business cycle. The theory builds on the assumption that information frictions prevent these agencies from rating firms correctly all of the time. As a result, the cost of bond financing becomes dependent on the state of the economy and the ''quality'' of the signal provided by these agencies' ratings. In addition, when the mix of bond issuers becomes riskier, as happens in recessions, bond financing becomes more expensive for mid-quality firms. Bond financing may even become more expensive to all firms, in which case mid-quality firms will be affected the most. The analysis of the bonds issued in the last two decades by American firms shows that split ratings, our proxy for the ''quality'' of the rating agencies' signal, do not affect the relative cost of bond financing across firms in expansions, but they do increase the relative cost of this funding source for mid-credit quality issuers in recessions.
Description:
This paper presents a theory of firm access to the bond market in which information gathering agencies are valuable but alter the relative cost of bond financing across firms and over the business cycle. The theory builds on the assumption that information frictions prevent these agencies from rating firms correctly all of the time. As a result, the cost of bond financing becomes dependent on the state of the economy and the ''quality'' of the signal provided by these agencies' ratings. In addition, when the mix of bond issuers becomes riskier, as happens in recessions, bond financing becomes more expensive for mid-quality firms. Bond financing may even become more expensive to all firms, in which case mid-quality firms will be affected the most. The analysis of the bonds issued in the last two decades by American firms shows that split ratings, our proxy for the ''quality'' of the rating agencies' signal, do not affect the relative cost of bond financing across firms in expansions, but they do increase the relative cost of this funding source for mid-credit quality issuers in recessions.
