A multi-attribute e-auction mechanism for procurement: Theoretical foundations [An article from: European Journal of Operational Research]
Description
This digital document is a journal article from European Journal of Operational Research, published by Elsevier in 2006. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
We describe a multi-attribute e-auction mechanism, with a focus on its theoretical foundations. Our mechanism is designed for auctioning multiple units of a good, primarily in B2B transactions. It can be used in various types of forward and reverse auctions/RFQs (Request for Quote), although the emphasis in this paper is on procurement. To incorporate the auction owner's preferences across issues/attributes in an auction/negotiation setting, we adopt a novel application of the 'pricing out' technique. Another key feature of our mechanism is the optimization-based 'suggested price' decision support component, which momentarily gives the best price acceptable to the buyer.
Description:
We describe a multi-attribute e-auction mechanism, with a focus on its theoretical foundations. Our mechanism is designed for auctioning multiple units of a good, primarily in B2B transactions. It can be used in various types of forward and reverse auctions/RFQs (Request for Quote), although the emphasis in this paper is on procurement. To incorporate the auction owner's preferences across issues/attributes in an auction/negotiation setting, we adopt a novel application of the 'pricing out' technique. Another key feature of our mechanism is the optimization-based 'suggested price' decision support component, which momentarily gives the best price acceptable to the buyer.
