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Internet auctions with many traders [An article from: Journal of Economic Theory]
Book Details
Author(s)M. Peters, S. Severinov
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000P6XNI0
ISBN-13978B000P6XNI6
AvailabilityAvailable for download now
MarketplaceUnited States 🇺🇸
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Economic Theory, published by Elsevier in 2006. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
We study a multi-unit auction environment similar to eBay. Sellers, each with a single unit of a homogeneous good, set reserve prices at their own second-price auctions. Each buyer has private value for the good and wishes to acquire a single unit. Buyers can bid as often as they like and move between auctions. We characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this decentralized dynamic mechanism in which, conditional on reserve prices, an efficient set of trades occurs at a uniform price. In a large but finite market, the sellers set reserve prices equal to their true costs under a very mild distributional assumption, so ex post efficiency is achieved. Buyers' strategies in this equilibrium are simple and do not depend on their beliefs about other buyers' valuations, or the number of buyers and sellers.
Description:
We study a multi-unit auction environment similar to eBay. Sellers, each with a single unit of a homogeneous good, set reserve prices at their own second-price auctions. Each buyer has private value for the good and wishes to acquire a single unit. Buyers can bid as often as they like and move between auctions. We characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this decentralized dynamic mechanism in which, conditional on reserve prices, an efficient set of trades occurs at a uniform price. In a large but finite market, the sellers set reserve prices equal to their true costs under a very mild distributional assumption, so ex post efficiency is achieved. Buyers' strategies in this equilibrium are simple and do not depend on their beliefs about other buyers' valuations, or the number of buyers and sellers.
