Stock grants as a commitment device [An article from: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control]

This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, published by Elsevier in 2006. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

Description:
A large and increasing fraction of the value of executives' compensation is accounted for by security grants. However, in most models of executive compensation, the optimal allocation can be implemented through a sequence of state-contingent cash payments. Security awards are redundant. In this paper we develop a dynamic model of managerial compensation where neither the firm nor the manager can commit to long-term contracts. We show that, in this environment, if stock grants are not used, then the optimal contract collapses to a series of short term contracts. When stock grants are used, however, nonlinear intertemporal schemes can be implemented to achieve better risk-sharing and higher firm value.