Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium [An article from: Games and Economic Behavior]

This digital document is a journal article from Games and Economic Behavior, published by Elsevier in 2006. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

Description:
In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence of play (the period-by-period behavior as well as the long-run frequency) to Nash equilibria of the one-shot stage game, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random experimentation some recall, or memory, is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it suffices to recall the last two periods of play.