![Acid rain in China and Japan: A game-theoretic analysis [An article from: Regional Science and Urban Economics]](https://www.ebooknetworking.net/books/B00/0PC/bigB000PC0MP6.jpg)
Acid rain in China and Japan: A game-theoretic analysis [An article from: Regional Science and Urban Economics]
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Book Details
Author(s)
Y. Nagase, E.C.D. Silva
Publisher
Elsevier
ISBN / ASIN
B000PC0MP6
ISBN-13
978B000PC0MP2
Marketplace
Canada 🇨🇦
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Regional Science and Urban Economics, published by Elsevier in 2007. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
Chinese sulfur dioxide emissions cause acid rain in China and in Japan. This is an interesting case of transboundary pollution to which economists have paid little attention. We examine simultaneous and sequential noncooperative games to illustrate the shortcomings of decentralized policy making. Sequentiality seems to be important, since one may interpret China's disposition against limiting its sulfur dioxide emissions as signaling policy leadership vis-a-vis Japan. Motivated by the inefficiency of decentralized behavior, we design an efficient and potentially implementable international scheme under which a benevolent international agency, mirrored after the Global Environment Facility, makes income transfers from Japan to China.
Description:
Chinese sulfur dioxide emissions cause acid rain in China and in Japan. This is an interesting case of transboundary pollution to which economists have paid little attention. We examine simultaneous and sequential noncooperative games to illustrate the shortcomings of decentralized policy making. Sequentiality seems to be important, since one may interpret China's disposition against limiting its sulfur dioxide emissions as signaling policy leadership vis-a-vis Japan. Motivated by the inefficiency of decentralized behavior, we design an efficient and potentially implementable international scheme under which a benevolent international agency, mirrored after the Global Environment Facility, makes income transfers from Japan to China.
