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A theory of jump bidding in ascending auctions [An article from: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization]
Book Details
Author(s)R.M. Isaac, T.C. Salmon, A. Zillante
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000PDSAHM
ISBN-13978B000PDSAH2
MarketplaceIndia 🇮🇳
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, published by Elsevier in 2007. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
Jump bidding is a commonly observed phenomenon that involves bidders in ascending auctions submitting bids higher than required by the auctioneer. Such behavior is typically explained as due to irrationality or to bidders signaling their value. We present field data that suggests such explanations are unsatisfactory and construct an alternative model in which jump bidding occurs due to strategic concerns and impatience. We go on to examine the impact of jump bidding on the outcome of ascending auctions in an attempt to resolve some policy disputes in the design of ascending auctions.
Description:
Jump bidding is a commonly observed phenomenon that involves bidders in ascending auctions submitting bids higher than required by the auctioneer. Such behavior is typically explained as due to irrationality or to bidders signaling their value. We present field data that suggests such explanations are unsatisfactory and construct an alternative model in which jump bidding occurs due to strategic concerns and impatience. We go on to examine the impact of jump bidding on the outcome of ascending auctions in an attempt to resolve some policy disputes in the design of ascending auctions.
