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Tariff bindings and bilateral cooperation on export cartels [An article from: Journal of Development Economics]
Book Details
Author(s)B. Hoekman, K. Saggi
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000PDSCXE
ISBN-13978B000PDSCX2
AvailabilityAvailable for download now
MarketplaceUnited States 🇺🇸
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Development Economics, published by Elsevier in 2007. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
Despite the negative international externalities that they generate, export cartels are legal in many countries. We use a repeated game approach to analyze cooperation between a low-income country (LIC) and its high-income country (HIC) trade partner where the HIC agrees to prevent its industry from organizing as an export cartel in return for a combination of improved market access (i.e. a tariff reduction) and a transfer from the LIC. If the LIC is subject to a tariff binding (say because of an existing trade agreement), the transfer it pays to the HIC increases and the scope for bilateral cooperation declines.
Description:
Despite the negative international externalities that they generate, export cartels are legal in many countries. We use a repeated game approach to analyze cooperation between a low-income country (LIC) and its high-income country (HIC) trade partner where the HIC agrees to prevent its industry from organizing as an export cartel in return for a combination of improved market access (i.e. a tariff reduction) and a transfer from the LIC. If the LIC is subject to a tariff binding (say because of an existing trade agreement), the transfer it pays to the HIC increases and the scope for bilateral cooperation declines.
