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On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects [An article from: Journal of Economic Theory]
Book Details
Author(s)S. de Vries, J. Schummer, R.V. Vohra
PublisherElsevier
ISBN / ASINB000PDSDY2
ISBN-13978B000PDSDY2
MarketplaceGermany 🇩🇪
Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Economic Theory, published by Elsevier in 2007. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
We construct an ascending auction for heterogeneous objects by applying a primal-dual algorithm to a linear program that represents the efficient-allocation problem for this setting. The auction assigns personalized prices to bundles, and asks bidders to report their preferred bundles in each round. A bidder's prices are increased when he belongs to a ''minimally undersupplied'' set of bidders. This concept generalizes the notion of ''overdemanded'' sets of objects introduced by Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor for the one-to-one assignment problem. Under a submodularity condition, the auction implements the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves outcome; we show that this type of condition is somewhat necessary to do so. When classifying the ascending-auction literature in terms of their underlying algorithms, our auction fills a gap in that literature. We relate our results to various ascending auctions in the literature.
Description:
We construct an ascending auction for heterogeneous objects by applying a primal-dual algorithm to a linear program that represents the efficient-allocation problem for this setting. The auction assigns personalized prices to bundles, and asks bidders to report their preferred bundles in each round. A bidder's prices are increased when he belongs to a ''minimally undersupplied'' set of bidders. This concept generalizes the notion of ''overdemanded'' sets of objects introduced by Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor for the one-to-one assignment problem. Under a submodularity condition, the auction implements the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves outcome; we show that this type of condition is somewhat necessary to do so. When classifying the ascending-auction literature in terms of their underlying algorithms, our auction fills a gap in that literature. We relate our results to various ascending auctions in the literature.
